

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL POSS DUPE

PAGE 01 LONDON 11466 061701Z

66

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

----- 051849

R 061438Z SEP 74

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3639

INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 11466

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: TECH, PFOR, IN, UK, US

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION CONCERNS

REF: NEW DELHI 11520 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: TENTATIVE THINKING AT FCO OFFICIAL LEVEL (WHICH MIGHT CHANGE) IS TO URGE BRIEF CALLAGHAN MENTION OF BRITISH CONCERNS RE PROLIFERATION TO SWARAN SINGH IN NEW YORK. POSSIBILITY OF FOLLOW-UP AFTER SECRETARY KISSINGER'S VISIT TO NEW DELHI REMAINS OPEN. CONSCIOUS OF UNSATISFACTORY NATURE RECENT CANADIAN TALKS WITH INDIANS, FCO OFFICIALS PREFER TO CONCENTRATE ON THE POSSIBLE, NOT JUST THE DESIRABLE. IN THAT CONNECTION, ONE FCO OFFICIAL THINKS US AND UK EFFORTS MIGHT AIM LESS AT RESTRAINING INDIANS' OWN PLANS AND MORE AT WINNING INDIAN PROMISE (A) NOT TO EXPORT TECHNOLOGY TO THIRD COUNTRIES AND (B) NOT TO AGITATE IN UN FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. OFFICIAL NOTES IN PASSING RECENT REPORTS THAT INDIANS MAY BE MAKING INQUIRIES OF FRENCH (AND SOVIETS) RELATED TO BALLISTIC MISSILES TECHNOLOGY. END SUMMARY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LONDON 11466 061701Z

1. DURING DISCUSSION SEPTEMBER 4, FCO SOUTH ASIAN DEPARTMENT HEAD CHALMERS FILLED US IN ON CURRENT TENTATIVE

PLANS AT HIS OFFICIAL LEVEL ABOUT NEXT STEPS IN NUCLEAR TALKS WITH INDIANS. HE CAUTIONED THESE HAVE NOT BEEN THRASHED OUT COMPLETELY YET, NOR RECEIVED MINISTERIAL APPROVAL.

2. WITHOUT REFERRING IN DETAIL TO AMBASSADOR WALKER'S CONVERSATION WITH SINGH (REFTEL), CHALMERS SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD NOT BE WISE TO ENGAGE INDIANS ON THIS SUBJECT AT OFFICIAL LEVEL PRIOR TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL. HE THOUGHT FCO WOULD URGE ON FONSEC CALLAGHAN A BRIEF (HALF-HOUR) MEETING WITH SWARAN SINGH IN NEW YORK, EVEN THOUGH CALLAGHAN WOULD ONLY HAVE ABOUT A DAY AND A HALF THERE. CHALMERS THOUGHT SUCH A BRIEF REMINDER OF UK CONCERN BY CALLAGHAN WOULD BE JUST WHAT IS NEEDED PRIOR TO SECRETARY KISSINGER'S VISIT TO INDIA LATER THIS YEAR. DISCUSSION WAS UNLIKELY TO BE EXTENSIVE SINCE NEITHER CALLAGHAN NOR SINGH WOULD HAVE THEIR NUCLEAR EXPERTS WITH THEM.

3. CHALMERS LEFT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS WITH THE INDIANS AFTER THE KISSINGER VISIT. HE EXPECTED THIS WHOLE SUBJECT TO BE DISCUSSED WHEN DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY (FOR ASIA) WILFORD AND HE CAME TO WASHINGTON IN EARLY OCTOBER, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE SEATO MEETING. (CHALMERS HAS ALSO ASKED BRITISH EMBASSY WASHINGTON TO SET UP SERIES OF SEPARATE CONSULTATIONS WITH DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS FOR HIM, AS WAS DONE SO WELL LAST YEAR. WE HOPE THIS WILL BE POSSIBLE.)

4. REVIEWING HIS DOUBTS AS TO EFFICACY OF ANY APPROACH TO INDIANS, CHALMERS MADE PASSING REFERENCE TO RECENT CANADIAN EXPERIENCE, AND CANADIAN UNHAPPINESS AT UNSATISFACTORY NATURE OF "EXPLANATIONS" PROVIDED BY INDIANS TO THEM. (INCIDENTALLY, WILFORD AND HE PLAN TO STOP OVER FOR TALKS IN OTTAWA ON WAY BACK FROM US IN OCTOBER.)

5. CHALMERS READILY ASSENTED WHEN WE RECALLED HE HAD ALWAYS HAD DOUBTS ABOUT HOW MUCH EFFECT WESTERN REPRESENTATIONS WOULD HAVE ON INDIANS ANYWAY. HE NOTED THESE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 LONDON 11466 061701Z

VIEWS WELL KNOWN TO USG IN WASHINGTON, BUT REHEARSED FOR US, INFORMALLY, HIS FEELINGS ABOUT THREE IDEAS THAT HAD BEEN RAISED BY USG DURING THOMSON VISIT. THE ONLY ONE OF THEM THAT HE THOUGHT BOTH USEFUL AND PRESENTABLE TO INDIANS WAS JOINT US/UK EFFORT TO OBTAIN QUIET, UNPUBLISHED PROMISE THAT INDIA WOULD NOT EXPORT ITS NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY. AN ADDITIONAL IDEA, CHALMERS SAID, MIGHT BE TO GET INDIAN PROMISE NOT TO AGITATE PROLIFERATION ISSUE IN UN DISCUSSIONS, IN RETURN FOR US-UK NON-AGITATION AGAINST INDIAN POLICY.

6. IN CLOSING, CHALMERS MADE SOME REMARKS ABOUT INDIANS
CHATTING-UP FRENCH (AND SOVIETS) THESE DAYS IN CONNEC-
TION WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES TECHNOLOGY. HE WAS NOT
SPECIFIC, AND OPINED THAT SUCH CONTACTS WERE PRELIMINARY
AT THIS STAGE--BUT WORTH WATCHING.
SOHM

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY, NUCLEAR TESTS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 06 SEP 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974LONDON11466
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740248-0478
From: LONDON
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740969/aaaacgjt.tel
Line Count: 122
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: NEW DELHI 11520 (NOTAL)
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <19 MAR 2002 by elyme>; APPROVED <16 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION CONCERNS
TAGS: TECH, PFOR, IN, UK, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005